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1. Introduction
The term ”anthropic principle” was first introduced in the famous ex-
position of Carter (1974). The Strong Anthropic Principle (henceforth
SAP), as defined by Carter, states that:
...the Universe (and hence the fundamental parameters on which it de-
pends) must be such as to admit the creation of observers within it at
some stage.
This principle expresses an observational selection effect: If we have a
cosmological theory according to which there are multiple universes or
”domains”, then when thinking about the observational consequences
of that theory we have to take into account only those domains in which
observers exist. For example, even if the vast majority of domains are
inhospitable to life, the theory would predict that we will be observing
one of the exceptional domains where conditions appear to be fine-
tuned for life to exist. The only speculative feature of SAP is thus that
it is applicable only if there is a multiverse; beyond that it is simply
a logical truism, albeit an important one (Leslie 1989). By contrast,
the so-called Final Anthropic Principle, introduced in the monograph
by Barrow & Tipler (1986), can make no such claim to methodological
status. It states that:
Intelligent information-processing must come into existence in the uni-
verse, and, once it comes into existence, it will never die out.
We wish to remove the teleological overtones from this statement and
focus on the latter part of it, which clearly expresses a scientific hypoth-
esis that is susceptible to refutation on observational grounds. To avoid
confusion, one may use the expression ”Final Anthropic Hypothesis”
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2(henceforth FAH) to refer to the following conjecture: Once intelligent
information processing comes into existence, it will never die out.
It should be noted at this stage that in their explanation and dis-
cussion of the Final Anthropic Principle, Barrow and Tipler (1986) do
not refer to multiple universes in any form. This should be emphasized
all the more strongly for the fact that, in other parts of their book,
the possibility that the observed world is but one among many others
(the general idea of an ensemble of universes, a ”multiverse”) is ex-
plored. In light of recent data, as we shall show in the next section, the
existence of a multiverse appears to be the only chance of indefinite
survival of intelligent life. It is therefore essential to understand the
FAH in such a way as to make room for this possibility. Even with this
clarification, however, the FAH as stated above is susceptible to various
differing interpretations. In particular, we need to distinguish between
the following two meanings:
1. There is at least one intelligent race in the universe that will con-
tinue to exist indefinitely. For the sake of brevity, we shall call this
interpretation individualistic.
2. Any particular intelligent race might eventually die out, but intel-
ligent life as a whole will exist indefinitely. This interpretation may
be termed holistic.
Statement 1. logically implies statement 2., but not vice versa. In a
sense, one could make a comparison with the local character of con-
servation laws in classical physics. As discussed by Feynman in his
popular exposition (Feynman 1965) electric charge could, in principle,
be conserved in two ways: locally and non-locally. Charge could be
moved within a box, or it could vanish at one point and be created ex
nihilo at another point within a box. Physics allows only for the former
way of charge conservation, but laws governing life and intelligence in
the universe are much less known than laws of classical physics. Obvi-
ously, the local way of conservation is analogous to the individualistic
interpretation of the FAH conjecture, while non-local appearance and
disappearance of charges are similar to rises and falls of intelligent
communities at various points in spacetime.
One reason why FAH is an interesting hypothesis is that we might
be interested in knowing whether there is any theoretical possibility for
the human species or its descendants to survive indefinitely, in the sense
of performing an infinite number of computations along its world-line
(Tipler 1994). For the settlement of this question, the individualistic
reading is obviously more relevant than the holistic reading. From now
on, we shall therefore assume the individualistic reading when referring
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3to the FAH, unless otherwise stated. Our goal is thus to investigate
whether recent progress in cosmology can actually support the con-
jecture that information processing is necessarily finite within our (or
any!) domain, and what recourse is left for the proponents of the FAH
(see also Tipler 1986). In this respect, it seems that we are in the middle
of a major change of cosmological paradigm (not unexpected, however,
as even the cursory look at relevant literature could show). Recent
results of the surveys of the Type I supernovae at cosmological distances
strongly indicate the presence of a large cosmological constant (Perl-
mutter et al. 1998; Reiss et al. 1998). If the total cosmological density
parameter corresponds to the flat (Ω = 1) universe, the contribution
due to vacuum energy density is
ΩΛ ≈ 0.7. (1)
This result indicates not only that the universe will expand indefinitely,
but that it will expand in an (asymptotically) exponential manner,
manner, similar to the early inflationary phase in its history. It should
be mentioned that a non-zero cosmological constant has been consid-
ered desirable from a several points of views in recent years, because it
would be capable of solving the cosmological age problem and because
it would arise naturally from quantum field theory processes (e.g. Klap-
dor & Grotz 1986; Singh 1995; Martel, Shapiro & Weinberg 1998). A
universe with Ω ≈ 1 and ΩΛ similar to the value in (1) would allow
the formation of galaxies (e.g. Weinberg 1987; Efstathiou 1995), and
it could last long enough for the life, including intelligent observers,
to evolve, all in agreement with SAP. However, we shall show that a
universe with a cosmological constant of this magnitude is one where
intelligent life cannot survive indefinitely, thus apparently contradicting
FAH.
2. Future of the Λ-universe
Universes with a cosmological constant Λ, a subclass of the Friedman-
Robertson-Walker (FRW) models, are represented by solutions of the
Einstein field equations in the generalized form
Rµν −
1
2
gµνR− Λgµν = −
8piG
c4
Tµν , (2)
where Λ is a positive scalar (for other notation see any of the standard
General Relativity textbooks, e.g. Weinberg [1972]; for history and
phenomenology of the cosmological constant, see the detailed review
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Figure 1. A sketch of evolution of a cosmological domain (conventional ”universe”),
with present epoch denoted with t0, and major phases in the universal expansion
labeled by Roman numerals (not drawn to scale).
of Carroll, Press & Turner [1992], and references therein). The value of
Λ in eq. (2) is related to the vacuum cosmological density fraction as
ΩΛ =
c2Λ
3H20
= 2.8513 × 1055 h−2Λ, (3)
where Λ is in units of cm−2, and H0 is the Hubble constant (H0 ≡ 100h
km s−1 Mpc−1). The Friedmann equation for the matter-dominated
case can be written as
H(t) =
a˙(t)
a(t)
= H0
{
Ωm
[
a(t)
a(t0)
]
−3
+ΩΛ − (Ωm +ΩΛ − 1)
[
a(t)
a(t0)
]
−2
} 1
2
.
(4)
In this formula, as well as in all others unless explicitly stated, cosmo-
logical matter density fraction Ωm and vacuum energy density fraction
ΩΛ are evaluated at the present time. The quantity K0 = Ωm+ΩΛ− 1
is sometimes called normalized present-day curvature. For practical
purposes, it is convenient to translate the eq. (4) into the ”redshift
language” as
H(z) = H0[(1 + z)
3Ωm − (Ωm +ΩΛ − 1)(1 + z)2 +ΩΛ]
1
2 . (5)
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into the past or future. Doing the latter shows that our domain cannot
remain matter-dominated at all times. Since the simplest dimensional
analysis (as well as physical experience) shows that the vacuum energy
density becomes progressively more important as the distances between
fundamental observers increase, we expect the universe to become dom-
inated by cosmological constant at some moment of its history. This
epoch at which universe becomes vacuum-dominated is obtained from
the equation (e.g. Adams & Laughlin 1997)
ti = t0 + τm
sinh−1(1)− sinh−1(√x)√
x
, (6)
(here sinh−1 denotes the inverse hyperbolic sine, not the reciprocal)
where
x ≡ ΩΛ
Ωm
=
ΩΛ
Ω− ΩΛ
=
ΩΛ
1− ΩΛ
, (7)
the last equality, applying, of course, to the globally flat universe (Ω =
1). The current age of the universe is denoted by t0 and the time
constant τm is defined as
τm ≡ (6piGρm)−
1
2 =
(
9
4
H20Ωm
)
−
1
2
=
6.5327 × 109 h−1√
Ωm
yr. (8)
Here, ρm is the matter density of the universe (i.e. matter plus - quite
negligible for the purposes of the present discussion - radiation energy
density). One should keep in mind that the current age of the universe
for ΩΛ given by the eq. (1) is (Perlmutter et al. 1998)
t0 = 14.9
+1.4
−1.1 ×
0.63
h
Gyr. (9)
The history of our domain is schematically presented in the Figure 2
(see also the complementary Fig. 1 in Kardashev 1997). Three major
epochs are denoted by large Roman numerals. The epoch of primordial
inflation (I) has been discussed in many - already classic - references
(e.g. Guth 1981; Linde 1983; Barrow 1988), and we shall not discuss
its details here. The entire history of the universe, as we know it from
observations (characterized mainly by the structure formation and evo-
lution processes) is contained in the epoch of power-law expansion (II),
described in classical cosmology textbooks (Weinberg 1972; Peebles
1993). We are currently inhabiting this expansion phase, our epoch
being denoted by t0; as can be seen from the eqs. (1) and (6) above, it
is likely that t0 is already located within the phase III, or at least close
to the end of the phase II (see Fig. 2).
FAH.tex; 3/02/2008; 20:23; p.5
60.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
-12
-8
-4
0
4
8
12
16
20
  h = 0.8
  h = 0.5
t i-
t 0
 
[G
yr
]
Ω
Λ
Figure 2. Duration of remaining time prior to the onset of future (quasi) exponen-
tially expanding phase in Gyr as a function of cosmological constant contribution to
the universal energy density in globally flat FRW universe. Vertical line represents
the currently believed value of vacuum energy density. Note that that for ΩΛ > 0.5,
the value of ti = t0 is negative, i.e. de Sitter expansion has already begun.
Finally, the epoch denoted by ”III” is the epoch of future exponential
expansion, or ”future inflation”, dominated by residual cosmological
constant Λ. In this epoch, the scale factor behaves according to the de
Sitter law, i.e.
R(t) = R0 exp(Ht), (10)
where the effective Hubble constant is given as H = c
√
Λ/3. The
present epoch, denoted by t0 is likely located in proximity to the epoch
ti, given by the eq. (6), characterizing the onset of future inflation
(Kardashev 1997), but t0 > ti. In the Fig. 2, the remaining time ti = t0
until the future inflation sets in is shown as a function of cosmological
constant energy density. As the entire discussion, this applies to the
case of global flatness of our domain. Since Hubble constant is still
poorly known, limiting values h = 0.8 and h = 0.5 are drawn (the latter
case has somewhat greater weight according to most modern measure-
ments). We notice that, for the recent measurements of ΩΛ ∼ 0.7,
the change from the power-law expansion toward the de Sitter state
given by (10) has occured 2 − 4 Gyr ago (dependent on the exact
value of H0). This is already small in comparison with the current age
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and of Pop I stars. Therefore, it is conceivable that the terrestrial life
began, interestingly enough, in the power-law, matter-dominated phase
of universal expansion, different from the one we are living in now. This
is not completely unexpected, if we keep in mind the Weak Anthropic
Principle, as pointed out, by Barrow & Tipler (1986), Weinberg (1987)
and Efstathiou (1995).
Prospects for survival of intelligent observers (and life in general) are
bleak in any form of open universe (Davies 1973; Dyson 1979; Barrow &
Tipler 1986; Tipler 1986). The entropy of each region increase, and all
available sources of energy for information processing (actually negen-
tropy) are inevitably depleted on time-scales varying according to the
particular open model considered. Of course, the exponential expansion
is fastest at creating such inhospitable environment, since after it sets
in the size of the horizon of each observer is shrinking rapidly (for the
exact treatment of horizons, see Ellis & Rothman 1993). The size of
the de Sitter horizon is given in such universe as
Rh =
c
H0
Ω−0.5
Λ
≈ 3.6 × 109
(
ΩΛ
0.7
)
−0.5
h−1 pc. (11)
Structures not gravitationally bound to the Local supercluster are al-
ready streaming across this boundary, which will coincide with the
radius of the visible universe in several Gyr (again, exact value depends
on H0). Some time after that, at the epoch which we can denote by th,
the Local supercluster will remain effectively the only structure existent
for local observers. However, the exact sequence of events depends on
the values of several still poorly known parameters, since the deple-
tion of galactic sources of energy, like normal stars or accreting black
holes, depends on the total quantity of gas available within gravitation-
ally bound systems and details of star-formation physics (Tipler 1986;
Adams & Laughlin 1997; C´irkovic´ 1999). Therefore, this depletion may
well be postponed until some point in the inflationary epoch. In other
words, we still cannot perceive with certainty what will be the position
of the ”see-saw” between local (galactic) and global (cosmological) pro-
cesses at the moment information processing ceases in our domain. The
point of essential inhospitability of eternally expanding universes has
been noted by several authors; for instance, Tipler (1986, 1994) insists
that only a special subclass of closed universes satisfies FAH within
a domain. The three basic conditions formulated by Tipler (1986) to
be satisfied for indefinite information processing seem to preclude FAH
1 which are more likely to harbour intelligent observers than the early Hubble
types, due to more advanced chemical evolution processes.
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vacuum energy density.
3. Many universes and the strategy of survival
In the sense discussed above, the quantity th represents the terminus
ante quem for the development and evolution of intelligent observers
in our universe. It is irrelevant for our present discussion whether th
has a sharp value or varies slightly due to the growth of cosmological
inhomogeneities so that limited regions can remain causally connected
at some time th + ∆t (where ∆t is small in comparison to th and to
t0). However, in order to establish most stringent constraints, one may
require that chain of occurences which leads to emergence of intelligent
observers (i.e. formation of Earth-like planets, formation of primitive
lifeforms, etc.) begins before ti, the transitional epoch to the vacuum-
dominated expansion. This requirement is most probably satisfied for
the case of human observers (as seen from Fig. 1, and data on age of
life, Earth, etc.).
What could the strategy of survival in such circumstances look like?
Since the entropy increase in each domain must necessarily preclude
further information processing in such a future inflationary universe,
even if all other requirements for sustaining intelligent observers are
satisfied, the only way of continued existence of such observers would
be to leave the cosmological domain where they originated. At first, it
sounds like a paradox, but in many contemporary versions of inflation-
ary cosmology, such ”escape from the universe” is theoretically possible.
Most significant quantum cosmological hypothesis, from this point of
view, is so-called ”chaotic inflation”, devised by Linde (1983), and
subsequently developed by Linde (1988, 1990) and other researchers
(e.g. Vilenkin 1995; Garcia-Bellido, Garriga & Montes 1998); it is also
discussed in this context by Barrow & Tipler (1986).
As Linde (1983) writes in the original paper on chaotic inflation:
In any case, in the infinite (open) universe at t ∼ tp there should exist
infinitely many domains of the type desired, which give rise to an infinite
number of mini-universes in which life may exist.
Many different (but generally similar) concepts of many-universe cos-
mologies appeared in the last few years, some based on the results of
quantum cosmology, others purely speculative. The details, however,
are not important in our present context. One constraint that the
FAH does impose on this type of scenario is that the time ti that
is available in the universe before the onset of its exponential expan-
sion phase must be sufficient to allow evolution of intelligent life and
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of ”inter-universe” transportation, through traversable wormholes or
otherwise (e.g. Morris, Thorne & Yurtsever 1988). We thus have the
following inequality:
ti(Ω,Λ,H0) ≥ τ. (12)
The left-hand side of this inequality is cosmological ”marble”, depen-
dent only on the three listed cosmological ”parameters” (hopefully to
be determined very soon and thus cease to be theoretical parameters)
while the right-hand side is ”wooden” evolutionary biology, sociology,
technology and other ”soft” disciplines (to paraphrase Einstein on his
field equations in the General Relativity). If we somehow knew it were
an exact equality, we should have wonder about the strangeness of such
a coincidence. As it is, this inequality represents a necessary condition
for FAH to be correct.
4. Discussion
It seems clear that within a single cosmological domain, the presence
of a non-zero vacuum energy density makes indefinite survival of intel-
ligence impossible. However, there are now several theories according
to which individual domains are but infinitesimally small regions of
the multiverse, over which quantum fields vary in a chaotic manner.
Some of these theories appear to permit travel from one domain to
another. Since such theories appear quite viable, at least at todays level
of understanding, it is still not possible to rule out indefinite survival of
intelligent beings in this wider context. Thus, while the Final Anthropic
Principle in its classical formulation pertaining to a single universe can
be considered refuted by empirical discovery of ΩΛ > 0, it can be
reformulated to encompass the entire multiverse.
On the other hand, this reformulation may introduce additional
problems, of the sort which has been known for the long time, and which
faces all cosmologies containing past temporal infinities. Namely, as
succinctly pointed by Paul Davies in his critiques of Ellis’ cosmological
model (see Davies 1978),
There is also the curious problem of why, if the Universe is infinitely old
and life is concentrated in our particular corner of the cosmos, it is not
inhabited by technological communities of unlimited age.
This problem has been plaguing all variants of the classical steady- state
theory of Bondi & Gold (1948) and Hoyle (1948).2 Essentially the same
2 There are galaxies of arbitrary age in this theory, since new ones are perpetually
created as the old ones recede away, and the characteristic time scale τs = (3H0)
−1
FAH.tex; 3/02/2008; 20:23; p.9
10
problem appears if we reformulate Davies’ statement in terms of the
multiverse: Why has our universe (our inflated bubble in Lindes pic-
ture) not been colonized or visited by some supercivilization originating
in a bubble much older than our own?
In the multiverse reformulation, there is now the problem of why our
causally connected domain (or even more general, our inflated bubble in
Linde’s picture) has not already been inhabited (or visited) by superciv-
ilizations originating in any bubble much older than ours. The simplest
solution is to assume that interbubble migration is impossible (which
might be supported by independent physical evidence in due course). As
we have seen above, however, this involves sacrificing the FAH. While,
undoubtedly, there are more subtle ways to retain interbubble travel
while not producing recognizable effects of technological origin (”The
Great Silence”; see e.g. Brin 1983 and Hanson 1998), this puzzle further
reduces the probability that the FAH is a correct physical proposition.
One conceivable way out for the proponent of FAP would be if it
turns out that new bubbles are forming at a sufficiently high rate. Asso-
ciated with travelling from one bubble to another there is presumably
some minimum cost, such as the matter and energy that have to be used
in the construction of a wormhole. Also, we can assume that it takes
some finite time for the construction to be completed. A superciviliza-
tion contemplating colonizing other bubbles would have to choose some
strategy of how to expend the resources they command. For example,
there might be a tradeoff between the amount of energy expended in
the construction of a wormhole and how quickly the project can be
completed. On the other hand, it might be worth spending a lot of
resources to complete a few wormholes quickly in order to then use the
resources in the domains thus colonized to build yet more wormholes,
and so on. Call a strategy optimal if it maximizes the expansion rate
dNC(t)/dt of the civilization in the long run (where NC(t) denotes the
number of domains the civilization has colonized by time t). Suppose
that the average growth rate of the number of domains in existence is
is only an average age of galaxies. At the time of formulation of the steady-state
theory, τs was considered small (∼ 6 × 10
8 yrs, due to the gross overestimate of
the value of Hubble constant at the time), and the Milky Way has already been an
extraordinary old galaxy, which certainly implied that surrounding galaxies are far
less probable to achieve the same degree of chemical and biological evolution (if our
case is an average one). However, if we take τs to be an order of magnitude higher,
in accordance of today’s best knowledge, the anthropic argument of Davies quoted
above gains force. Since the fraction of galaxies that are older than age t is given by
exp(−t/τs), it follows that there are almost 2% of all galaxies in any large enough
comoving volume which are twice the age of the Milky Way.
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dND(t)/dt. We can then formulate the following inequality:
dNC(t)
dt
<
dND(t)
dt
. (13)
If this inequality is satisfied, the fraction of all domains that are in-
habited by a supercivilization originating from some other domain will
tend to be negligible, consistent with the observation that our universe
does not seem to have been colonized by any such a civilization. (If,
on the other hand, the inequality were violated, the multiverse would
become satiated with supercivilizations, in apparent contradiction to
observation.)
Eq. (13) imposes an upper bound on dND(t)/dt. The FAH, as we
saw in earlier sections, implies that dND(t)/dt > 0, but only future
research will tell whether FAH is in fact correct.
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